# Epistemic background of social ontology

## Antecedentes epistêmicos da ontologia social

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## ABSTRACT

This article explores how epistemology plays a role within the realm of social ontology. My main claim is that every facet of the the social domain we deal with needs an epistemic framework and background in the construction of an ontology, contingent upon the fact that it has an ontological reality and existence. I think that two fundamentals make an significant contribution to this claim. The first of these is the notion of idea and its requisite foundation in social sphere, and the other is the concept concerning the common sense. Therefore, the initial part of this article centers on the treatment and examination of the the notion of the idea. My primary assertion in this section is to demonstrate that the concept of ide has a linguistic interconnection and that this connection needs a foundation within the social basis or context. In the subsequent fragment, where the concept of common sense is discussed, it is argued that common sense is a shared attribute among all individuals in common in the social field, and that it is emphasized that this shared common sense serves as an essential component making it possible to provide its epistemological foundations in the social context.

**Keywords**: Social Ontology. Sociability. Idea. Common Sense. Image. Epistemology.

## RESUMO

Este artigo explora como a epistemologia desempenha um papel no domínio da ontologia social. A minha principal afirmação é que cada faceta do domínio social com que lidamos necessita de um enquadramento epistêmico e de um contexto na construção de uma ontologia, dependendo do fato de ter uma realidade e existência ontológica. Penso que dois fundamentos contribuem significativamente para esta afirmação. O primeiro deles é a noção de ideia e seu requisito de fundamentação na esfera social, e a outra é o conceito relativo ao senso comum.

Portanto, a parte inicial deste artigo centra-se no tratamento e exame da noção de ideia. A minha afirmação principal nesta seção é a demonstração de que o conceito de ide tem uma interligação linguística e que esta ligação necessita de uma base dentro da base ou contexto social. No fragmento subsequente, onde se discute o conceito de bom senso, argumenta-se que o bom senso é um atributo compartilhado entre todos os indivíduos em comum no campo social, e se enfatiza que esse bom senso compartilhado serve como um componente essencial para a tomada de decisões, fornecendo seus fundamentos epistemológicos no contexto social.

**Palavras-chave:** Ontologia Social. Sociabilidade. Ideia. Senso comum. Imagem. Epistemologia.

## Introduction

In broad terms, the core concern and objective of social ontology is to comprehend the nature and essence of the social world. In this sense, social ontology asserts that every conceptual framework we have constructed essentially is of a genuine ontological existence within society. Consequently, the primary objective of social ontology is to reveal the underlying principles on which foundations the conceptual concepts making up and shaping up social reality are established.

Social Ontology has emerged as one of the contemporary topics of discussion for philosophical discourse. When considered as a concept, philosophy has constantly dealt with the issue of ontology through diverse foundations and approaches evolving over various periods. However, granting ontology is dealt with on the basis and functions changing in certain processes, ontological problems have managed to endure its relevance up-to-date in particular ways. Similarly, the definition of what we consider as "social" has permanently remained a pertinent issue in philosophical discussions and deliberations. However, the essence of social ontology lies in its exploration here which is the use of social and ontology together, that is, in relation to each other. Nevertheless, the main emphasis I want to focus on here is not to conduct a conceptual analysis of social ontology. Instead, my main objective is to examine the foundation of social ontology.

In this research, my focus and emphasis are on exploring the basic function of epistemology within the field of social ontology. My foremost aim will be to demonstrate that it is feasible to establish an ontological reality within the social domain with an epistemological reasoning. To achieve this, I focus primarily on examining the concepts such as image and idea, and focus on the fact that ontology highlights to a linguistic challenge in the social field. Subsequently, we will direct our attention upon the notion that ontology acquires reality in the social field thanks to the concept of common sense and ultimately establishing an epistemic basis for social ontology.

## 1  Conceptual framework of social ontology

The conceptual dimension of "social ontology" presents certain difficulties in the realm of philosophy. The difficulty is so much that it arises from the reference that ontology refers to in the history of philosophy, although this concept lacks an inherent social dimension. The complexity arises because contemporary thinkers such as Quine have offered definitions of ontology which make it problematic to determine the conceptual framework for social

ontology. In this regard, when we examine Quine's definition of the concept of ontology, as stated by him, ontology makes an inventory of some kind of objects. However, social ontology encompasses a scope extending far beyond the limited characterization given and concerned. First of all, it deals with how the social world is constructed and the ontological structure between different kinds of beings in this construction (EPSTEIN, 2016, p. 149). We can suggest that social ontologists, who adhere to this approach as the general framework of social ontology, define social ontology in the broadest sense as follows:

> […] the term "social ontology" can be understood in two ways that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the one hand, it may mean the study of the nature of social reality, of individuals, institutions, processes and so on that societies are composed of. Roughly, social ontology thus concerns those aspects of reality that social sciences study, as opposed to natural sciences. Its main task, understood in this way, is to determine the basic entities of social life, their interaction and change. On the other hand, "social ontology" may mean "ontology socialized", which is the study of "the social roots of conceptions of […] reality". In this sense, all ontology (of nature as well as of society) may be social (IKÄHEIMO; LAITINEN, 2011, p. 2).

This definition provides us a remarkably broad perspective of social ontology. According to Searle, one of the prominent social ontologists who supports this definition, numerous physical particles exist self-sufficiently of each other in various force fields throughout the world. These particles are organized into a coherent system. We humans also have a certain generic capacity for these particles as part of a certain consciousness and intentionality (SEARLE, 2006, p. 52). However, it is also likely to categorize the genre into two distinct groups such as naturalists and anti-naturalists. In the context of these two understandings, the existence of things like iron, copper and zinc, which are somewhere in nature, represent the types that are agreed upon within a explicit framework. what differs them are the other entities that fall outside the boundaries of predefined types. For example, concepts such as adolescence, class and homosexuality, which are considered as part of the social domain, are among the topics that provoke controversy between naturalists and anti-naturalists. In this respective, according to naturalists, all of these concepts, which form the social field somehow already exist in nature. Our role is merely to define, record and classify them. According to anti-naturalists, the meanings associated with these concepts were developed and provided at a later stage. In other words, there is no such thing as adolescence or class in nature, we have given such concepts an ontological reality (ROOT, 1996, p. 150).

This distinction can also be applied to facts: rude facts and institutional facts. If we examine the examples mentioned earlier: In the case of Thomas is 18 years old, which we can acknowledge as a rough phenomenon, it is wholly natural that Thomas is indeed 18 years old. Just as any element in nature process a reality other than the human institutional relations, it is similarly natural for Thomas to be 18 years old. It is because Thomas, like other individuals, undergoes a certain spiritual and physical development course in the historical process. Nevertheless, if we consider the example of Thomas is an adult, which we can accept as an institutional phenomenon, first of all, the term "adulthood" is primarily determined by a decision rendered by a certain institutional structure. In this sense, adulthood can be understood as 18 among some institutional contexts and as 21 in some institutional norms in place. In other words, while the institutional phenomenon may not recognize Thomas as an adult the day before he reaches 18, it may acknowledge him as an adult the next day, even if there is no noticeable modification or progress in mental and physical terms and attributes. This comes

across as a matter of fact that will be accepted as a result of the approval or rejection of institutional relations (ROOT, 1996, p. 155). This difference between facts traces its origins back to Plato in the history of philosophy. In his book The Republic, Plato emphasizes this distinction and refers to the legal and political nature of institutional facts. According to him, it is the governing authorities that determine the regulations of institutional facts. If the management is not fair in the laws it enacts, the institutional facts themselves will take a share from this situation and their negative reflection in the practical field will appear as something shaped only in favor of the strong (PLATON, 1991, 338e-339a).

For social ontologists, the main focus in this distinction has continuously been institutional facts. However, despite the fact they focused on institutional facts, they also drew attention to the social aspects of the facts, placing a distinction and relationship such as social facts and institutional facts at the center of the discussion. From the standpoint of social ontologists, we can classify the phenomena into two as social and institutional. We can define social phenomena as something that can be dealt with in a particular social relationship (SEARLE, 2006, p. 52). We can describe it as something that can be considered on the basis of a certain social phenomenon, such as my being a German citizen or the validity of the money in my hand and in my possession. Simultaneously, institutional phenomena serve as a representative reality of "objects", a notion that is accepted as a key concept for social ontology. In this sense, "representations of facts about 'objects' are propositional in structure, where it is the factitive rather than the 'objective' status of the entities represented that matters for human institutional reality" (GALLOTTI; MICHAEL, 2014, p. 5). Although social ontologists treat social facts and institutional facts separately in this way, they are actually two concepts that are inseparably intertwined. Searle's emphasis on the relationship between these concepts is quite thought-provoking. In his perspective, him, what we refer to social phenomenon reflects a collective entities. This collectivity is not only for humans but also for animals (SEARLE, 2006, p. 57).  For instance, it is conceivable to evaluate both the activities of a hunted wolf pack and that of a judge, within a social phenomenon. With this example, although Searle claims that animals have a certain social relationship identical to humans, his emphasis remains on the significance of institutional phenomena. Because, according to him, animals do not have institutional facts like humans (SEARLE, 2006, p. 61). The difference between institutional facts and social facts lies in their prerequisite for a certain symbolization. Symbolization here refers to a language in its broadest sense, and according to Searle, symbolization has to carry non-ontological forces here as well, for the reason that there is nothing in physical facts that carries deontology.

According to Searle, such forms of functions have various deontological powers: Rights, duties, and responsibilities…etc. They have to be defined within a certain linguistically. For we cannot define their deontological powers unless they are defined by any linguistic reality, that is, they do not have a representation in language (SEARLE, 2006, p. 61-62). It's basically like a soccer game. Unless the rules are explained (linguistically) or known in advance, it is not possible for such a game to run. This, in my opinion, constitutes the most basic starting point showing an epistemic requirement providing the flow a transmission of information thanks to the linguistic in the background.

## 2  Sociality of image, idea and language

When it comes to human beings, one of the fundamental assumptions that we can express is that he is inherently defined as a social being. Being a social being, a person builds a

shared living space with other people like himself on account of his inclination for being sociability and structures his whole life through this communal space. However, the mere act of human beings forming a common life due to being a social creature and their social nature is not sufficient to discriminate him from other living organisms. Because animals, much like humans, converge and create a shared living space. Therefore, it will always be insufficient for us to contemplate human beings through a common life cycle.

At this point, Locke's thoughts distinguishing humans from animals particularly over the social sphere are quite outstanding for us. Because, according to him, first of all, human has language itself, which is the most powerful tool to help us build on sociality (LOCKE, 1975, p. 402). Therefore, unless language is understood (in some aspects), even if we leave animals aside, we cannot even understand what characteristics human societies have and what distinguishes one society from others (SEARLE, 2006, p. 54). Language is a tool that it inherently conveys a social regularity in itself, and every sound we produce it possesses the potential to be echoed under certain conditions and uniformities in the social field and utter the identical meaning. In this condition, there is a clear distinction between the noises produced by animals and the sounds generated by nature through its natural processes. Locke thinks that there is an important dissimilarity between the sounds made by humans and animals. As per his perspective, occasionally, it is probable for an animal to produce certain regular sounds akin to those made by humans. Using the parrot example, Locke thinks that animals can employ certain sounds in a manner to humans. However, according to him, the difference between the sounds made by humans and animals is that humans can make an abstraction from these sounds, and animals lack this abstraction (MOORE, 2009, p. 37).

In this sense, the main focus for people is to engage themselves in imagine. As humans, we create mental images about various things. When we discuss a tree, we form a mental image of a tree, or when we talk about the stone, we similarly have a reference to the stone mentally. However, all kinds of things do not stand in front of us in a concrete and tangible way as is the case with a tree or stone. To illustrate, we can envision "a goat-headed lion", even if we never encounter it in our everyday experiences and daily life. Therefore, not all of our imaginative constructs may necessarily be the design of a reality. Because although we may visualize the image of a goat-headed lion, we do not actually encounter such a thing in the external world. But we can form fragmentary mental images of them. That is, it is possible for us to separately imagine a goat image or a lion image. The main thing we can infer from this is that we can have individual representations of what we can label as this or that.

However, possessing images about things is insufficient in our social relationships and interactions. Our images are oriented towards individual things and objects, which we can identify as this or that. Hence, if we are confined to only our images, it becomes impossible for a individual in a social relationship to make an epistemic transfer effectively. Because there must be such mechanisms that connect these images together that when a person signifies something, the same signification needs to be revived in another person's mind in a manner that creates a partnership in a particular and certain social space. What enables such a endeavor is essentially our ideas. Ideas appear as a means of providing partnership between phenomena in the social field. This partnership allows people to bring up the equivalent thing among themselves when they engage in conversations. In other words, both people talking about trees must possess the concept of a tree. Otherwise, if it does not exist as an idea and is restricted only to significations, we will never distinguish that people are talking and arguing about the identical things.

> Beside articulate Sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, that he should be able to use these Sounds, as Sings of internal Conceptions; and to make them stand as marks for the Ideas within his own Mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Men's Minds be conveyed from one to another (LOCKE, 1975, p. 402).

Gathering imagery under a general concept has been a very imperative aspect of language. In order for sounds to efficiently represent ideas, it is necessary for these mental images to encompass a wide range of specific samples and instances. This broad coverage is essential for the effectiveness of language. If we anticipate every individual thing should have a unique image, then the extensive vocabulary required for the language we use would pose challenges in using that language in its practical application. Thus, using general terms, language has enabled a single word to image many particular entities, and this useful use of sounds is derived from the distinction between the ideas of which they represent (PRISELAC, 2017, p. 5-6; LENNON, 2001, p. 156-157).

In accordance with Locke, our ideas, which we construct with the internal mental processes of our minds, manifest as linguistic expressions in the social context as things that substitute for nouns. Therefore, we can assert that every name must be associated with an idea, provided that it is "meaningful" within the topics of conversation within the social context concerned. However, we have some concepts referring to as nothing, absence, ignorance, which do not carry the condition of existence and convey the concept of non-existence. If we agree to take these as signifiers that do not correspond to any underlying idea, these concepts must be considered devoid of meaning. However, each of these names is something that has a social meaning and has ideas. Because, basically, each of these concepts is actually the negation of their existence (LOCKE, 1975, p. 403). These names expressing that the idea of nothingness should not be regarded as opposed to being, in fact, we have derived their ideas by negating the things we have, thanks to the concepts we signify.

In my view, Locke's notion of considering linguistic "meaningful" words under the concept of "positive ideas" originates from his recognition ideas in connection with the social sphere. In order to grasp this correlation, it is first necessary to dwell on how Locke arrived at the common sensible ideas that bring about the basis of our concepts and knowledge. According to him, all of our ideas are derived from the sensory experiences. There is no doubt that tangible entities that have a concrete reality have their origins in the realm of the sensible. Nevertheless, when it comes to the abstract concepts, according to Locke, even they are essentially derived from the sensible. In fact, if we express it as a sequence, there is essentially the sensible at the root of the insensible. In other words, there is a transition from the sense to the non-sensible.

Such a transition is supported by a social context in Locke as every non-sensible idea originates from an initially sensory idea. The idea, initially which is sensible, accrues with certain meanings and principles by those who first employ it. Using these imbued meanings and principles, individuals in the social field have translated these concepts into language with the help of names in order to describe more easily and describe their own information and mental processes to other individuals who share their understanding. Therefore, even if a name has the feature of being insensible, that name is both born from the sensible and this sensibility has an origin created by sociality and social interaction.

> Spirit, in its primary signification, is Breath; Angel, a Messenger: And I doubt not, but if we could trace them to them to their sources, we should find, in all Languages, the names, which stand for Things that fall not under our Senses, to have had their first rise form sensible Ideas. By which we may give some kind of guess, what kind of Nations they were,

and whence derived, which filled their Minds, who were the first Beginners of Languages; and how Nature, even in the naming of Things, unawares suggested to Men the Originals and Principles of all their Knowledge: whilst, to give Names, that might make known to others any Operations they felt in themselves, or any other Ideas, that came not under their Senses, they were fain to borrow Words form ordinary known Ideas of Sensation, by that means to make others the more easily to conceive those Operations they experimented in themselves, which made no outward sensible appearances; and then when they had got known and agreed Names, to signify those internal Operations of their own Minds, they were sufficiently furnished to make known by Words, all their other Ideas (LOCKE, 1975, p. 403-404).

The idea that all ideas eventually derive from the sensible in this way, in some aspects, has become the subject of discussion in contemporary studies an investigation of the mind for the reason that thinkers such as Putnam draw attention to the fact that "mental design" can give rise to diverse perceptions in the formation of the ideas. According to him, although we emphasize the concrete reality basis of the idea when discussing an idea, we should take into account that two people or groups might have dissimilar "mental designs" when talking about something. This design also basically consists of different types, substances, contents… etc. is sending (PUTNAM, 1988, p. 37-38). However, despite all these variations, ideas have permanently formed the basic component of communication as something that provides unity and cohesion.

Ideas provide a partnership of thought that makes communication possible in the social field, enabling meaningful interaction. This partnership is such that the individual recognizing that they can convey external sensible images to other people through words facilitated by the ideas that constitute their own thought content, and in this sense, there exists a harmony between the purposefulness of nature and words. However, despite the alignment between words and the purposefulness of nature, it does not necessarily imply that there is an inherent connection between regular sounds and ideas. Because if we were to acknowledge a natural connectivity then we would have to assume the uniform workings of nature across the earth; this could ultimately result in monolingualism due to the uniformity of the natural functioning. Therefore, it is feasible to distinguish this association from a natural connection and regard it as an artificial classification that can be determined by the wills.

The Comfort, and Advantage of Society, not being to be had without Communication of Thoughts, it was necessary, that Man should find out some external sensible Sings, whereby those invisible Ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose, nothing was so fit, either for Plenty or Quickness, as those articulate Sounds, which with so much Ease and Variety, he found himself able to make. Thus, we may conceive how Words, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, come to be made use of by Men, as the Signs of their Ideas; not by any natural connexon, that there is between particular articulate Sounds and certain Ideas, for then there would be but one Language amongst all Men; but by a voluntary Imposition, whereby such a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such an Idea (LOCKE, 1975, p. 405).

Therefore, what determines the ideas here is our collective will. These wills, too, do not appear as a situation depending only on the will of a single person. It exists as a common will(s). Because if we were to act according to the will of a single person, then we would be unable to converse on the commonality of ideas, and our communication would be limited to the images. Ideas therefore function principally as components of the social sphere through the commonality of wills.

As previously discussed, idea undertakes the task of enabling the individual to create a common perception in the mind of another individual, like himself or herself, while talking about a particular subject. In executing this role, it provides us the opportunity for communication between individuals. Or else, each individual remains confined within their own mental perceptions, disrupting communication channels with others. Indeed, in such circumstances, languages evolved in parallel with the growing number of individuals. However, when we contemplate the situation that the fundamental principle of languages is what enables and facilitates communication between individuals, we can assert that the presence of the idea and the existence of the language are interconnected and inseparable.

The unifying role of the Idea among individuals has made it something beyond individual individuals and beyond our impressions (WEITHOFER, 2011, p. 86). Because the judgment of a single individual about an idea is insufficient for the partnership that another individual can form in his mind. In the concept of ide, where: sociability holds precedence over individuality, it is possible for individuals to stay in sociability and get a share from this partnership. Otherwise, different meanings can be assigned to the concept of the equivalent idea in alternative field of sociality.

Thus, in the context of our study, we highlighted that the idea has a reality outside the individual and that this reality provides the opportunity for the insight of the common mind to convey an epistemic transmission in the field of sociality through language. However, this shared and common perception of mind, which the individual has established with the aid of ideas outside himself, must have some components that guarantees commonality within the mental perception of others sharing the same perspective. In other words, if we are discoursing the way of establishing a partnership between them with the concept of idea that transcends individuals one by one, then these individuals must possess a shared element in common that they have shared within themselves, in order that individuals can all turn to what we refer to as ide, thanks to this partnership.

## 3  The act of thinking and the concept of common sense: its role in the social sphere

I contend that the epistemic foundations of this partnership were laid on two distinct principles, particularly with Descartes: the first is the act of thinking and the other one is centered on the concept of common sense. As is commonly recognized, the foundations of modern philosophy were laid by Descartes. It could claim that one of the factors making him an important figure is that he made imperative contributions to contemporary philosophy. Modern philosophy, identical to other philosophical paradigms, detached from the preceding traditions and brought a novel understanding of philosophical thought and perspective. Apart from the philosophical traditions before it, modern philosophy first of all means a new subject design, and the founder of this tradition is Descartes as it is known (HATTAB, 2009, p. 221).

We can say that Descartes, who tried to justify his new subject design with the famous phrase "I think, therefore I am" (DESCARTES, 2006, p. 28), tries to emphasize the mutual connection between thinking and existence in the ontological sense. This emphasis principally forms the foundation of the construction of individualistic epistemology. According to Descartes, the only thing I can say with certainty among my knowledge is my own thinking activity (MARKIE, 2005, p. 150). In this cognitive venture, my thinking is directed towards something that points to ontological existence. Therefore, if I'm thinking, I'm thinking about

something. Because thinking itself signifies an awareness that we realize as specific to something. Therefore, starting from this point, I first reach the thinking being with the thinker. Later, in the expression I think, I can begin to realize the epistemic construction of the establishment of the reality of things outside of me, together with the fact that I have reached the necessity of the existence of the object of thinking needed for thinking (SPALLANZANI, 2019, p. 24).

From the point of view of Descartes, human is not a being who purifies the condition of being from a skeptical argument and puts it on a generally accepted basis only thanks to the act of thinking in the expression "I think, therefore I am". At the same time, human is a being who not only acts as a *Cogito*, but also communicates with other people like himself, establishes a common life with them and builds a sociality through this common lifespan. All of these, the epistemic construction of the foundation on which all knowledge of the external world is built, also takes place in the individual's own understanding as a *Cogito* activity, as Descartes emphasizes (ELRED, 2008, p. 566). This is because, according to Descartes, a human being is a being who can apprehend the obligatory condition of his own existence knowledge with the help of an epistemic argument thanks to the act of thinking, and can also grasp the construction of the social field through his own perception, yet again through the epistemic fiction which is intrinsic to his own act of thinking. Therefore, the act of thinking in the epistemic framework established with *Cogito* also constitutes a basis for the space that people in the social field will construct their reality through their own world.

A person in the social field builds a shared world with other people collaboratively through his own perception and interaction. This world is something that contains both him and others like him. Since the social space, formed by the gathering of many people, shows us a community formed both by the understanding of individuals and by the convergence of other individuals who are like-minded. However, the most foremost aspect we need to focus on here is what is the thing that binds them together and enables them to have a shared and common understanding, despite the fact that everyone has their own understanding in the social field. To put it differently, there must be a common epistemological point that unites countless individuals together so that we can establish the social foundations and principles of a public. Descartes, in his book *A Discourse on the Method*, acknowledges the following about the concept of common sense, which he accepts as common in every human being:

> Common sense is the most evenly distributed thing in the world; for everyone believes himself to be so well provided with it that even those who are the hardest to please in every other way do not usually want more of it than they already have. Nor is it likely that everyone is wrong about this; rather, what this shows is that the power of judging correctly and of distinguishing the true from the false (which is what is properly called good sense or reason) is naturally equal in all men, and that consequently the diversity of our opinions arises not from the fact that some of us are more reasonable than others, but solely that we have different ways of directing our thoughts, and do not take into account the same things (DESCARTES, 2006, p. 5).

For Descartes, common sense is a universal attribute we have in common. It is such a thing that no one has more or less. Everyone has an equal level. Everyone is therefore on an equal footing in having common sense. In fact, for Descartes, common sense is a faculty that can be utilized in the same sense as reason. Common sense as such is a fragment of human nature for Descartes. Nevertheless, this idea shared by Descartes has correspondingly turn out to be an central theme of criticism. In this context, according to Adorno, a prominent 20th-

century thinker, the rejection of common sense is prioritized amid the things in human nature, even supposing it is something that is collective in common. Because common sense means the precise assessment of conditions in a given situation, and this worldly eye which is a practical perspective, which has been trained by the market in these conditions, is of a handful aspects in common with dialectics. In this regard, "the sobriety of common sense undeniably constitutes a moment of critical thinking. But its lack of passionate commitment makes it, all the same, the sworn enemy of such thinking. For opinion in its generality, accepted directly as that of society as it is, necessarily has agreement as its concrete content" (ADORNO, 2005, p. 72). Although Adorno's critique refers to a world that, unlike Descartes, where common sense is affected by external factors of human nature, in my view, they both principally encounter at the same point. According to Descartes, common sense manifests itself in "the power to judge well and to distinguish what is right and what has been considered wrong". On the contrary, Adorno criticizes the transformation that "mutual agreement and acceptance", in which this power manifests itself only in the social field, has lost its inherent authenticity and has become a convenient tool of the "market" in our age.

So how does common sense work in the social sphere? Common sense is, in essence, the sole thing that ensures commonality in the social context for Descartes. Because Descartes handles common sense in manner where he views it as a ground and/or foundation that transcends the *Cogito* of individuals and where these individuals catch common sense with each other. When we recall Descartes' argument "I think therefore I am", Descartes specifically refers to the thinking individual. However, the focal point our discussion here is the necessity of having something that transcends the individual and exists in all of us in common in a world that is perceiving and constructed by the whole individual with his/her own understanding[1]. Descartes fills the void here with common sense. Common sense provides a shared perception of the world, perceived differently by each individual. According to Descartes, who perceives this shared perception as common sense, although people are equivalent in terms of common sense, they can occasionally think differently about the same subject. However, this discrepancy doesn't stem from a deficiency in common sense but rather from the fact that individuals approach the world with diverse perspectives and outlooks. Therefore, common sense, which is what every individual in the social field exists in himself and also in other individuals of their kind, enables us to obtain a shared epistemological framework in the social domain.

## Conclusion

In this article, where we explore the epistemological foundations of social ontology, we perceive the revelation of several crucial insights in terms of the issue concerned. At the forefront of these observations lies the essential role of epistemology in the construction and shaping the framework of social ontology. Epistemology serves as a foundation upon which social ontology is built. It is through the common epistemological framework shared by all individuals within the social realm, forming the basis of social ontology, that we can discuss the existence

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[1] The notion of common sense in Descartes has been and is generally examined and discussed in an epistemic context based on its knowledge and understanding. However, I think that this concept extends to an epistemic context. In accordance with Descartes's opinion, common sense is treated as something that we have in common as individual individuals, through which "the power to make judgement what is good" and "to distinguish right from wrong". Therefore, common sense serves as a tool that enables us to work with common consensus "what is ethically" and "what is similarly right" in our practical activities in the social sphere. This leads us to a place in which the idea that common sense is something that can primarily be active and operate in the social field.

of ontology itself. Therefore, within the domain of social ontology, it is not probable to lay the foundations of the social field unless there is an epistemic partnership.

My assertion is that the epistemological foundations of social ontology is supported on two fundamental pillars. The initial point of these is the idea, the other is the concept of common sense. Therefore, in the primary part of the article, we deliberated the concept of ide and the epistemological foundations of its linguistic connection with the social field. In the subsequent section, we focused on why there is a need for a common epistemology in the social field with the concept of common sense.

In the first part, where our emphasis focused on the concept of the idea, our chief argument was the linguistic context within which the idea operates. In this context, our objective was to demonstrate that what we possess an idea is an epistemological thing that ensures our partnership with other individuals. Since obtaining and possessing an idea of something is also a representation of an epistemic unity that we collectively share with other individuals like ourselves. Without this epistemic unity, discussing an idea would become unlikely, and everything would be limited to individual perception, merely evolving into isolated mental images. The concept of Idea principally has a distinct nature based on the senses in the external world. However, there exists some notions that we cannot say that they have an attribute affiliated with the senses. However, even when it may seem initially that specific opinions lack a direct sensory connection, they are frequently rooted in our sensory experiences within interpersonal relationships. Therefore, the chief conclusion we have attained in this section is that ideas fundamentally originate from social interactions.

In the second part, where we discussed the concept of common sense, we first focused on the fact that the source of all our knowledge arises from the act of thinking of the person who is in the act of thinking. Man, who is a thinking being, reaches absolute knowledge of his own existence, as Descartes mentioned, through the act of thinking. However, based on my conclusion, the thinking being not only lays the individual epistemology of its own existence, but also lays the epistemic foundations of the social field, thanks to the act of thinking. Because the thinking being, the human being, is the being that is in a relationship with other people and establishes communities through the existence of this relationship. Therefore, the human being, while engaged in the act of thinking, forges a conceptual framework for the world through their own "cogito". This, in turn, empowers them to construct the social space through their thought processes. However, in the social field, the question arises concerning what makes commonality in the world that each individual has built on their own thought process. In other words, how is the partnership in the social field possible within everyone's individual act of thinking? To me, this resolves the problem with the concept of common sense. Because, as Descartes stated, common sense is something shared by everyone. Every individual in the social field operates within this framework by obtaining a share of this common sense, and common sense enables him to act with a certain common epistemology in the social field. Therefore, it can be concluded that with the concept of common sense, we are principally dealing with a common form of epistemology in the social field.

To summarize, that social ontology has an epistemic background is an imperative. Because, thanks to the epistemic background, we can grasp the possibility of a flow of information in the social field. However, the key aspect of what we are expressing here is a common epistemology shared by all individuals by transcending individual understanding and transforms into a social phenomenon. To achieve this, the initial step, there is a need for common ideas shared and embraced by all individuals in the social field. At that moment, in order to ensure the commonality of these common ideas, that all individuals in the social field must

have common sense is an obligation. Therefore, in conclusion, we can affirm that epistemology provides a unifying role in Social Ontology.

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