Nagel's reduction theory revisited
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36517/Argumentos.22.4Keywords:
Intertheoretical reduction. Nagel. Scientific explanation.Abstract
The aim of this paper is to develop further a model of reduction derived from Nagel’s model and from the deductive-nomological model of explanation. We propose this development by examining its consistency with the history of physics, in particular, with Nagel´s further account of the history of physics. In the first part, we introduce the issue of intertheoretical reduction. In the second, we examine the partial consistency of the derived D-N model of reduction with Nagel’s further considerations on reduction. As a conclusion, we argue that, in agreement with Nagel´s theory, the full consistency with history of science is a criterion needed for any purported theory of reduction and that the autonomy of the reducing science is to be preserved.
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