Conceptual plausibility and the rationality of theistic belief

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v17i1.94847

Keywords:

Conceptual plausibility. Inductive plausibility. Explanatory fruitfulness. Concept of God.

Abstract

In this article, I present a defence of conceptual plausibility, understood as an epistemic way to qualify concepts that situates them between the merely possible and the actual. To show that there is such a thing as conceptual plausibility, I rely on what seems to lie at the heart of many uses of the phrase ‘plausible concept’: explanatory fruitfulness. To make an effective case for the claim that conceptual plausibility is of philosophical interest, I present an argument based on the debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God. To show that conceptual plausibility is philosophically feasible, I first show that it cannot be reduced to propositional plausibility. Next, I offer a minimally precise characterization of conceptual plausibility; I approach this from a qualitative and comparative perspective as well. Finally, I show how these qualitative and comparative criteria of conceptual plausibility might be applied to the debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God.

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Author Biography

Ricardo Silvestre, Universidade Federal de Campina Grande (UFCG)

Doutor em Filosofia pela Universidade de Montreal, Canadá (2005). Realizou estágio pós-doutoral na Universidade de Oxford (Faculdade de Filosofia), Reino Unido (2017), na condição de academic visitor. Também foi visiting scholar no Centro de Estudos Hindus de Oxford (Reino Unido, 2024), no Centro de Filosofia Comparada da Universidade Estadual de San José (EUA, 2020), na Universidade de Notre Dame (EUA, 2006) e na Universidade do Québec (Canadá, 2000). Atualmente é Professor Titular da Universidade Federal de Campina Grande, membro do programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, pesquisador sênior da Universidade de Brasília, e líder do grupo de pesquisas Lógica e Religião. É membro da Sociedade Brasileira de Lógica (SBL), da Associação Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião (ABFR) e da Associação de Lógica e Religião (Logic and Religion Association). Tem experiência nas áreas de Filosofia da Religião, Lógica Filosófica, Filosofia Indiana e Filosofia da Mente.

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Published

2025-07-31 — Updated on 2025-10-02

How to Cite

Silvestre, R. (2025). Conceptual plausibility and the rationality of theistic belief. Argumentos - Revista De Filosofia, 17(1), 369–390. https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v17i1.94847

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