The intentionality of consciousness in Husserl

Authors

  • Maria de Lourdes Silva

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v1i1.18920

Keywords:

Husserl. Intentionality. Consciousness. Subject. Object.

Abstract

This article is intended to show that, in Husserl’s account, the intentionality of consciousness is constituted as a ‘subject x object’ relation. Husserl recognized the ‘ego’ as the first absolute truth, nonetheless, unlike Descartes, Husserl conceived it is as a reality directed to an object. Therefore, intentionality represents the directedness of consciousness towards an object. It will be claimed that Husserl deemed possible the return to the seminal intuition of the phenomena, so as to grasp – based on the synthetic capacity of consciousness – how it relates both to the subject and to the object, and how experienced states are connected.

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Author Biography

Maria de Lourdes Silva

Mestranda em Filosofia, Universidade Federal de Goiás.

Published

2009-01-01

How to Cite

Silva, M. de L. (2009). The intentionality of consciousness in Husserl. Argumentos - Revista De Filosofia, 1(1). https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v1i1.18920

Issue

Section

Artigos

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