What is missing from analytic-inspired contemporary discussions of akrasia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v17i1.94507Palavras-chave:
Akrasia. Weakness of willpower. Contemporary philosophy. Inquiry-based epistemology. Conceptual engineering.Resumo
This paper is an exercise in conceptual engineering, the philosophical practice of analysing concepts, identifying their actual and/or potential limitations, and designing new ones. In engaging in conceptual engineering, one aims to improve a concept’s clarity, usefulness, or alignment with certain goals. In this paper, I tackle the concept of akrasia that has been deployed by contemporary analytic-inspired philosophers in recent decades, people such as Donald Davidson, Richard Hare, Alfred Mele, and others. I argue two things. First, that the contemporary discussion of akrasia among these scholars has progressively moved away from the original discussion of akrasia amid the ancient sources, whereby reference to akrasia is first found. Second, that the concept of akrasia deployed by contemporary analytic-inspired discussion suits the goals of this discussion, which is primarily concerned with explaining how akrasia is possible or why it is not; but it does not suit the goals of understanding what akrasia is.
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