O que está faltando nas discussões contemporâneas de inspiração analítica sobre akrasia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36517/arf.v17i1.94507Keywords:
Akrasia. Fraqueza da força de vontade. Filosofia contemporânea. Epistemologia da investigação. Engenharia conceitual.Abstract
Este artigo é um exercício em engenharia conceitual, a prática filosófica de analisar conceitos, identificar suas limitações reais e/ou potenciais e projetar novos. Ao se envolver em engenharia conceitual, busca-se melhorar a clareza, utilidade ou alinhamento de um conceito com certos objetivos. Neste artigo, abordo o conceito de akrasia que vem sendo empregado por filósofos contemporâneos de inspiração analítica nas últimas décadas, pessoas como Donald Davidson, Richard Hare, Alfred Mele e outros. Eu argumento duas coisas. Primeiro, que a discussão contemporânea sobre akrasia entre esses estudiosos se afastou progressivamente da discussão original sobre akrasia entre as fontes antigas, onde as primeiras referências à akrasia são encontradas. Segundo, que o conceito de akrasia empregado na discussão contemporânea de inspiração analítica se adéqua aos objetivos desta discussão, que se preocupa principalmente em explicar como a akrasia é possível ou por que não é; mas não se adéqua aos objetivos de entender o que akrasia é.
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